The Effect of Old Age Assistance on Retirement

Researchers have devoted considerable attention to analyzing the impact of Social Security on retirement, with mixed findings. However, Old Age Assistance (OAA), a means-tested program established at the same time, dwarfed Social Security until the 1950s and coincided with the early decline in elderly participation. In addition, OAA benefit levels were determined by the states - a key source of policy variation that is missing in the case of Social Security. I estimate the relationship between OAA benefit levels and elderly labor force participation using individual data from the 1940 and 1950 Censuses. The effect of OAA is found to be strong and implies that participation would have risen slightly instead of falling if benefits had not been raised during the 1940s. I also present evidence against the endogeneity of state benefit levels.

The Impact of Technological Change on Older Workers: Evidence from Data on Computer Use

New technologies like computers alter skill requirements. This paper explores two related effects of computers on older workers, who use computers less. The evolution of computer use in the Current Population Survey suggests that impending retirement reduces the incentive of older workers to acquire new skills. The Health and Retirement Study shows, further, that computer users retire later than non-users. This may arise because computer users choose to retire later and also because workers planning later retirement choose to acquire computer skills. Instrumental variables estimates suggest that computer use directly lowers the probability of retirement.

Explaining the Evolution of Pension Structure and Job Tenure

Current and expected job tenure have fallen significantly over the last two decades. Over the same period, traditional defined benefit pensions, designed to reward long tenure, have become steadily less common. This paper uses a contract-theoretic matching model with moral hazard to explain changes in pension structure and job tenure. In our model, a decline in the value of existing jobs relative to new jobs reduces expected match duration and thus the appeal of DB pensions. We show that this explanation is consistent with observed trends and suggests an additional consequence of technological change that has not been closely studied.

Retirement and the Evolution of Pension Structure

Defined benefit pension plans have become considerably less common since the early 1980s, while defined contribution plans have spread. Previous research showed that defined benefit plans, with sharp incentives encouraging retirement after a certain point, contributed to the striking postwar decline in American retirement ages. In this paper we find that the absence of age-related incentives in defined contribution plans leads workers to retire almost two years later on average, compared to workers with defined benefit plans. Thus, the evolution of pension structure can help explain recent increases in employment among people in their 60s, after decades of decline.

Economics of marriage and divorce

In order to understand these ideas, we have to develop a model of both marriage and divorce (or, in other words, a model that allows for changes over time in the utility from marriage). In this chapter, we will set the stage for this analysis by discussing trends in marriage and divorce in Section 1. The major changes in matrimonial patterns in North America and Europe that we will highlight serve as a backdrop for the analysis we will introduce in the rest of the chapter. Then, to keep things simple, we will discuss separately the gains from marriage versus living together (Section 2), the reasons why people marry (Section 3), the nature of decision-making within marriage (Section 4), and the nature of the decisions to marry and to divorce (Section 5).marriage, divorce

Determinants and Consequences of Bargaining Power in Households

A growing literature offers indirect evidence that the distribution of bargaining power within a household influences decisions made by the household. The indirect evidence links household outcomes to variables that are assumed to influence the distribution of power within the household. In this paper, we have data on whether a husband or wife in the Health and Retirement Study %u201Chas the final say%u201D when making major decisions in a household. We use this variable to analyze determinants and some consequences of bargaining power. Our analysis overcomes endogeneity problems arising in many earlier studies and constitutes a missing link confirming the importance of household bargaining models. We find that decision-making power depends on plausible individual variables and also influences important household outcomes, with the second set of results much stronger than the first set. Current and lifetime earnings have significant but moderate effects on decision-making power. On the other hand, decision-making power has important effects on financial decisions like stock market investment and total wealth accumulation and may help explain, for example, the relatively high poverty rate among widows.

Life is Cheap: Using Mortality Bonds to Hedge Aggregate Mortality Risk

Using the widely-cited Lee-Carter mortality model, we quantify aggregate mortality risk as the risk that the average annuitant lives longer than is predicted by the model, and we conclude that annuity business exposes insurance companies to substantial mortality risk. We calculate that a markup of 3.7% on an annuity premium (or else shareholders%u2019 capital equal to 3.7% of the expected present value of annuity payments) would reduce the probability of insolvency resulting from uncertain aggregate mortality trends to 5% and a markup of 5.4% would reduce the probability of insolvency to 1%. Using the same model, we find that a projection scale commonly referred to by the insurance industry underestimates aggregate mortality improvements. Annuities that are priced on that projection scale without any conservative margin appear to be substantially underpriced. Insurance companies could deal with aggregate mortality risk by transferring it to financial markets through mortality-contingent bonds, one of which has recently been offered. We calculate the returns that investors would have obtained on such bonds had they been available over a long period. Using both the Capital and the Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Models, we determine the risk premium that investors would have required on such bonds. At plausible coefficients of risk aversion, annuity providers should be able to hedge aggregate mortality risk via such bonds at a very low cost.

Explaining the evolution of pension structure and job tenure

Average and expected job tenure of workers has fallen significantly over the last two decades. Workers have also experienced a major shift in pension coverage. Traditional defined benefit pensions, designed to reward long tenure, have become steadily less common, while defined contribution pensions, which are largely portable, have spread. The link between job tenure and pension trends has not been closely examined, but it offers insights about both phenomena. This paper uses a contract-theoretic matching model with moral hazard to explain changes in both pension structure and job tenure; we discuss how a richer model with job-specific human capital subject to technology shocks would yield similar results. In our model, a decline in the value of existing jobs relative to new jobs reduces expected match duration and thus the appeal of DB pensions. We argue that these trends are linked to changes in the nature of new technologies. This explanation is consistent with observed trends in technological change, tenure, and pension structure. Our results suggest an additional consequence of technological progress that has not been closely studied.Pensions ; Retirement ; Defined benefit pension plans ; Defined contribution pension plans